ABSTRACT Taint-style vulnerabilities can damage the service provided by mobile seriously. The patternbased method is a practical way to detect taint-style vulnerabilities. Most of the methods extract the vulnerability patterns from the code base, however, sometimes missing the vulnerability patterns and resulting in some vulnerabilities undiscovered. The security patches contain valuable information about the vulnerabilities. To compensate for the inherent incompleteness of pattern matching, in this paper, we propose an approach to infer patterns with the security information carried on the security patches. The taint-style vulnerability is described as a 3-tuples (S src , S san , S sink ) here, which consist of sources(S src ), sanitization (S san ), and sinks(S sink ). For each pair of vulnerable and patched programs, we extract the sanitizations from the changes between the vulnerable code and corresponding patches, infer the sinks with the impact analysis, and determine the sources through the backward traversal on the control flow graph. Finally, the completelinkage clustering method is applied to the extracted triples to summary the patterns. We evaluate our method with open source projects. The results show our method is effective: 1) our method infers vulnerability patterns for taint-style vulnerabilities; 2) compared with the method inferring patterns from the code base, new patterns are discovered; and 3) the inferred patterns are applied to search the similar vulnerabilities successfully.
I. INTRODUCTION
The taint-style vulnerability is a serious threat to computer security and especially do damage to mobile devices and web application. These vulnerabilities propagate data from attacker-controlled sources to security-sensitive sinks without sanitization operations, and leak the important data of users. The ''Heartbleed'' bug in OpenSSL discovered in 2014 [1] is a prominent example of the taint-style vulnerability, which affected lots of communication services provided by web applications.
Researchers have proposed a variety of static(e.g., [6] , [8] , [10] , [11] ), and dynamic [9] techniques to detect taint-style vulnerabilities. For example, Gotovchits et al. [6] apply the novel technique named µflux to check the taint-style security properties in binary code, and finds 0-day vulnerabilities in COTS x86, x86-64, and ARM software. More recently, pattern-based methods ( [2] , [3] , [7] ) have been provided to The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Shuiguang Deng. detect taint-style vulnerability. This idea can construct a large database of patterns for known vulnerabilities and can be easily matched with source code. Unfortunately, based on the statistical methods, the pattern-based methods mine the most frequent patterns in the code repositories. However, some vulnerability patterns may be ignored in this method as the low frequency. This drawback introduce the false negatives in the vulnerability detection.
Security patches are applied to fix the vulnerabilities once the vulnerabilities are discovered. As the taint-style vulnerabilities are always caused by missing sanitization checks, to fix these vulnerabilities, the patches are required to add sanitizations in the vulnerabilities, and complete the security policies, which are violated by the vulnerabilities.
Motivated by it, in this paper, we present a method to automatically inferring patterns for taint-style vulnerabilities with security patches. For each taint-style vulnerability, we extract the changes between the vulnerable code and the corresponding patches, and determine the added condition statements as sanitization. And then we infer the sinks with the impact analysis technique. Next, the source is determined through the backward traversal. With three key elements are determined, we cluster the sanitizations and sources respectively for every sink, and finally summarize the patterns expressed as the search patterns. Our method not only can be applied to detect the vulnerabilities, but also as a supplement to the already existing vulnerability patterns. We evaluate our method with patches collected from the open source projects. Finally, 6 patterns are inferred by our method and the inferred patterns are applied to the real-world projects successfully.
In summary, our contributions are the following.
• We propose a novel method to infer vulnerability patterns with security patches, which is an effective way to discover the new vulnerable patterns.
• Six vulnerability patterns are inferred with the method we proposed.
• Similar code are found by applying the inferred patterns to the real world project. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II we provide a motivation example. Our method for inferring patterns with security patches is presented in Section III, and our experiment results are showed in Section IV. We discuss the related work in Section V. Section VI summarizes our contributions and our plans for future work.
II. MOTIVATION
In this section, we present the example motivating our approach. The Heartbleed vulnerability discovered in OpenSSL is a prominent example of a taint-style vulnerability. The code fragment in the Listing 1. shows the code to patch this vulnerability. The code in green is the differences between vulnerability code and patch code, which is a security check added in the patch to fix the vulnerability. In this code fragment, the variable payload defined by the macro n2s is the taint source, as it reads a sixteen bits integer from a network stream (line 11). And the function memcpy is the security-sensitive sinks(line 26), which should assure that the memory allocated to third argument is not larger than the size of the second argument. However, in the vulnerable code, the taint source reaches the security-sensitive sinks memcpy directly without any validation. Once the attacker input a integer more than sixteen bits, the uninitialized heap memory may be copied to the buffer bp and the sensitive information of user will be disclosed. To fix the vulnerability, the constraint at line 12 is added in the patch to sanitize the tainted source, and assured that payload is smaller or equal to the size of the source buffer pl. This case demonstrates the patch contains valuable information for vulnerability detection. Motivated by this example, we proposed a method to extract security checks with patch analysis and infer vulnerability patterns. The approach is detailedly presented in the following.
III. THE APPROACH
In this section, we present our approach to infer vulnerability patterns with security patches. There are two key insights in our method: the vulnerabilities are similar and the security patches can been leveraged to derive meaningful information about vulnerabilities. The taint-style vulnerability is a direct consequence of missing sanitization. Generally, the patch fixes the vulnerability by adding appropriate sanitization. These facts provide the possibility to infer vulnerability patterns by exploring the security information from the patches.
We depict the overview of our approach in FIGURE 1. To construct the effective search patterns, we collect patched programs and the diff files, which describe the difference between the patched code and the vulnerable code, from software repository. Then we implement four-step procedures to identify source, sanitization and sink precisely, which are the core ingredients for taint-style vulnerability descriptions.
1) Extracting the sanitization. The patch contains the security constraint to fix the vulnerability, and the diff files describe the difference between the patched code and the vulnerable code. We use the diff files to localize the changed statements in patch, and identify the conditions changed as the potential sanitizations. 2) Determining the sinks. The extracted sanitizations are leveraged to implement impact analysis as changed set. The sinks, which impacted by the changes, are obtained with the impact analysis techniques. 3) Determining the source. After the sink and the sanitization are determined, we use the backward traversal to compute the reachability from the sink to the source. If it is reachable, the source is determined. 4) Clustering and generating search patterns. Finally, with the source, sanitization and sink are extracted, we cluster the triples, and express the vulnerability patterns as search patterns.
A. EXTRACTING THE SANITIZATION
Missing sanitization checks for tainted source are the major reason for taint-style vulnerabilities. To fix the vulnerability, security analysts usually add sanitization in the patches, which is different from the vulnerable code. So we extract the sanitization by analyzing the changed code in patches.
To maintain the security of software, the security analysts for open source projects fix the vulnerabilities immediately once the vulnerabilities are discovered. The patched code will be published at the meanwhile. And diff files, which describe the changes from the patched code and the vulnerable code, also be published in the repository. We extract the changed code in patches with the diff files.
The Listing2. shows a diff file, which point out the location of changed code(line 5). Obviously the changed codes in diff file are marked by the prefix. The line prefixed by a ''+'' symbol means this line is added in the patch, and the ''−'' symbol means this line is deleted in the patch. The vulnerable code can be obtain with the lines prefixed by ''−'' symbol and the lines with no prefix. Similarly, combining the lines prefixed by a ''+'' symbol and the lines with no prefix, the patched codes are obtained. We use Patch to restore the vulnerable code with patch and diff files. To represent the source code, the control flow graphs CFG vul and CFG patch for the vulnerable program and the patch are constructed respectively. With the help of diff files, the locations of changed codes in CFG vul and CFG patch can be determined. In general, the conditions statements contain the constraints, which is interesting for the security analysts. Therefore, we exploit the information contained in the condition statements as the sanitizations in this paper.
B. DETERMINING THE SINKS
It is obvious that the behaviors of vulnerable program and patched program are different. In other words, the program behaviors, such as the sinks, will be affected by the changes between the patches and the vulnerable program. To determine the sinks, we implement the impact analysis for the VOLUME 7, 2019 change sets obtained from above steps, and compute the impact set affected by the change sets. Finally, the sinks are determined with the help of existing source-sink lists.
Listing 3.
A code snippet for impact analysis.
1) IMPACT ANALYSIS
The changed code would impact the programs' behaviors through the program dependence. We adapt the method proposed in [23] to implement the impact analysis. The goal of the impact analysis is to compute the impact set with the changed set. Here, we denote the changed codes obtained from above step as the changed set. And the impact set is initialized with the changed set. We compute the impact set with the control flow dependence, data flow dependence, and the interprocedural dependence.
The Algorithm 1. describes the process to implement the impact analysis, which complete the intraprocedural and interprocedural analysis in order.
Considering the control flow dependence and the data flow dependence in the intraprocedural analysis(INTRAPROCE DURAL()), the changed set(I _set) and program dependence graph(dg) are used as the input. At the meanwhile, the data flow dependence and the control flow dependence are computed for every statement(line 16,17). As we known, if the variable ''a'' is defined at statement l_a(denote as Def (l_a)) and is used by variable ''b at statement l_b(denote as Use(l_b)), the value of variable ''b'' will be changed once the variable ''a'' is changed. The statement at line 25 in Algorithm 1.states the impact propagation rule for data flow dependence. Similarly, the impact propagation rule for control flow dependence is presented in line 18. The code describes that the statements should be added in the impacted set if they are control dependent on a conditional statement.
The arguments in the callee method are marked as changed in interprocedural analysis. If the impact set computed by the changed arguments are non-empty(line 6), it indicates the callee method is impacted by the changed code, and the call site should be added in the impacted set. To complete the interprocedural analysis, the procedure INTERPROCEDURAL() traverse the call graph in depth-first I _set = C_set; 3: CN=ChildNodes(Root(CG)); 4: for each n in CN do
5:
Inter_set = INTRAPROCEDURAL(I _set, DepGraph(n)); 6: if I _set == ∅ then I _set = I _set Inter_set 7: Continue; 8:
SubTree=SubTree(n); I _set =interprocedural(Inter_set, SubTree); 10: end if 11: end for 12: return I _set; 13: end function 14: function INTRAPROCEDURAL(I _set,dg) 15: for each s in m do 16: CtrDep =CtrDepComputing(s,dg);
17:
DataDep =DataDepComputing(s,dg); 18: for each cp ∈ CtrDep do 19: if !isCaller(cp) then 20: if s ∈ I _set and cp ∈ m then 21: I _set = I _set {cp} 22: end if 23: end if 24: end for 25: for each dp ∈ DataDep do 26: if !isCaller(dp) then 27: if s ∈ I _set and dp ∈ dg and Def (s) ∈ Uses(dp) then 28: I _set = I _set {dp} 29: end if 30: end if 31: end for 32: end for 33: return I _set; 34: end function order and complete the INTRAPROCEDURAL() process for every function.
The Listing 3. shows a code snippet for impact analysis. In this example, the statements at line 4 and at line 5 are added. The variable z at line 7 is data flow dependence on the variable x at line 3, and the statement y = y + z at line 6 is control-dependent on the conditional statement at line 5, so the statement z = bool(y, x), y = y + z is added in the impact set. The FIGURE 2(a) shows the dependence graph for function bar, and the changed code are marked as the gray nodes. And the FIGURE 2(b) shows the result of impact analysis for function bar. As the call graph shown in the FIGURE 2(c), the function bool has been impacted by the changed in function bar. According to the interprocedural analysis, the statements at line 12,13,14,15 are impacted. The impact set for Listing 3 is {l 6 , l 7 , l 12 , l 13 , l 14 , l 15 }. FIGURE 2. shows the result of impact analysis for code in Listing 3. The changed code in the FIGURE 2(a) are marked as the gray nodes.
2) EXTRACTING THE SINKS
The patches for taint-style vulnerabilities change the sinks' program behaviors mainly. Generally, the sinks are the security sensitive operations, which is interesting for the analysts. Without additional information to determine the sinks are difficult. Here we extract the sinks with the help of existing source-sink list [26] . For each element included in the impact set, we determine whether the element is the sink by querying the existing source-sink list. If the element is found in the source-sink list, the element is a sink.
C. EXTRACTING THE SOURCE
After the previous steps are implemented, the sanitizations and the sinks are extracted. For taint-style vulnerability, the path from the source to sink is reachable. Hence, the sources can be determined by computing the data-flow reachability from the sinks to the sources.
Begin with the sinks, we backward traversal on the program dependence graph. If a node V n can be reached from the sink node V sink through the sanitizations node V san and contained in the source-sink list, this node V n is considered as a source node. With the source, sink and sanitization are extracted, the 3-tuples (soure, sanitization, sink) characterize the taint-style vulnerability is determined.
Algorithm 2 summarize the whole process of our method to extract the triples. The algorithm takes the patched program, diff files and the given source-sink list as the input. By locating the changed code and implementing the impact analysis, the sanitization and the sinks for the vulnerability are determined. Since precise taint analysis addresses the data-flow reachability from sources to sinks. For every sink obtained from the impact analysis, we implement the backward reachable analysis to obtain the source. If the reached point is found in the given source-sink list, the source related to the sink and the sanitization is determined. for each sink∈CandidateSinks do 6: if sink∈ SL then 7: for eachsource ∈ SL do 8: if backward traversal(sink, 9: statement,source) then 10: R = R∪ (sink,statement,source); 11: end if 12: end for 13: end if 14: end for 15: end if 16: end forreturn R;
D. CLUSTRING AND GENERATING SEARCH PATTERNS
After the 3-tuples of (soure, sanitization, sink) are obtained, we use the complete-linkage [34] clustering method to cluster the sanitizations and sources respectively for every sink. Clustering is useful, because multiple similar sanitizations and sources would indicate a common features for the vulnerability. To perform this step, the clustering method in [2] is adapted.
Before clustering the source, the callees and types for each source are clustered using the complete-linkage clustering method. And then a set C of callees and type clusters for each VOLUME 7, 2019 source are obtained. With the set of callee and type clusters C, each source s has corresponding clusters, which denotes as C s . Then each source s can be presented as a vector which dimension is associated with one of the clusters of C. The equation 1 shows the map φ : S → {0, 1} n , where the c the coordinate φ c is given by
and n is the total number of callee and type clusters |C|.
For the sanitization, each condition is represented as a syntax tree, and then we embed the tree to vectors based on the neighborhood hash kernel proposed in the [2] . After the sanitizations are represented as vector, the linkage clustering is employed to cluster the sanitizations and sources. Finally, the cluster identifiers of all sanitizations and sources are combined to generate the search patterns. In this paper, we use the template [2] shown in the Listing 4 to express the patterns. The getCallsTo(sink), taintedSouce and the unchecked denote the name of the sensitive sink, the data sources of each argument as well as descriptions for their sanitization respectively. To understand the patterns easily, the patterns are summarized as the regular expressions from the clusters finally.
IV. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we conduct a series of experiments to evaluate our method. We evaluate our method's ability to generate patterns with the open-source project. And then, we compare our method with Joern [2] , a tool to infer vulnerability patterns from code base, and evaluate whether our method can infer new pattern. Finally, the patterns are utilized to detect the vulnerability.
We conduct the experiments to answer the following research questions.
• RQ1:Does the patterns can be inferred successfully with the security patch?
• RQ2:Does the method can infer new patterns which is undiscovered in other method?
• RQ3:Does the inferred patterns can be applied to found similar vulnerability? The experiments were conducted on an HP z420 workstation with 8GB RAM and Intel Core CPU i5-3337U v2 1.80GHz.
A. DATA COLLECTION
PHP is widely used in the web applications and open source. we mining the PHP' repository to collect the patched code and the diff files as our data. As the overflow is one of the taint-style vulnerability, here we collect the patches of overflow vulnerability.
The CVE Details [35] is a website which documents the vulnerabilities information identified by the CVE-ID. For each CVE-ID, the website has recorded the vulnerability information, such as vulnerability type, the name of vulnerable file and the reference links to the patches. So We crawl the patch links corresponding to a CVE-ID from this website. If a single vulnerability entity links multiple patches, the heuristics mentioned in the [34] are applied to solve the problem. If the names of the patched files are the same with the names of the vulnerable files, the diff is incorporated. If the CVE-ID is mentioned in the web page of the patch linked, the diff is also incorporated. Finally, we claw the vulnerability in PHP, and collect 174 patches and 151 diff files as our data.
B. INFERRED VULNERABILITY PATTERNS(RQ1)
For each program, we locate the changed code in patch to extract the sanitization, implement the impact analysis and backward traversal to determine the sinks and the source. Finally a 3-tuples of (soure, sanitization, sink) is obtained to describe the security characters of the vulnerability. With above steps, we obtain 210 3-tuples and 5 sinks. Table 3 shows the distribution of sinks. As the number of last 2 sinks are too less to cluster, we discard these data and select first three sinks, the memcpy, strcpy, and sprintf, to cluster. With the 3-tuples extracted, we proceed to cluster the 3-tuples and generate vulnerability patterns. Table 1 shows the inferred patterns with our method. To easily understand, the patterns utilizes the regular expressions to describe the common features for the source and the sanitization. The symbol ''−'' means there are no constraint to the sanitization.
Once the cluster has been done, for every sink, there are several sources and sanitizations corresponding to it. Table 1 shows the patterns related to the sink memcpy and strcpy. The first pattern restrains the length of string when the memcpy be called. The second pattern describes the constraint should be satisfied when the source is related to the size of data. The third sanitization restrict the size of the third source. Similar to the second pattern, the third pattern describes the same constraint. However, it focused on the length of input string, which is different with second one in the type of sources. And the fourth pattern describes the first argument to memcpy from the source n2s should be compared with NULL to ensure that it is not a NULL pointer. The fifth and sixth patterns are related to the sink strcpy. As the fifth pattern shows, once the strcpy has been called, the first source related to it is a char variable, and the second is a const. Besides, the fifth pattern also reminds that both sources should not be null pointer. The sixth pattern constraint that the first arguments has enough memory to hold the second arguments when the strcpy has been called.
C. THE NEW PATTERNS INFERRED(RQ2)
Joern, proposed in the [2] , is an effective method to infer vulnerability patterns from the code base. Different with the Joern, our method infers the vulnerability with the security patches. We compare our method and the Joern over the data we collected and evaluate whether our method can infer new pattern.
The Joern require to give sinks when it infer the patterns. Here we apply Joern to the projects we collected and use the sinks in Table 3 as the input of Joern. The Joern generates the definition graphs for each given sink, which encode both source and sanitizations. And then, to seek the patterns in the definition graphs, the clustering is employed to generate clusters of similar definition combinations along with their sanitizers. Finally, the patterns are expressed as the regular expressions, which contain the longest common sub sequences of the above clusters. Table 2 shows the patterns inferred by Joern, which are related to the sink memcpy. Compared with the patterns inferred by our method, the second, third and fourth patterns in Table 1 , are also inferred by Joern. But, Joern missing the first pattern in Table 1 . Analyzing the process of Joern generates patterns, we find that the source of the pattern is less in the PHP code base. As the Joern mining the most frequent patterns in the code base, the low frequent patterns in the code repositories are ignored. This result shows that our method can be a supplement to complete other methods.
As the Table 2 shown, the last two patterns are not inferred by our method. This is because that the sources related to these patterns are less in the patches we collected.
D. APPLICATION OF PATTERNS(RQ3)
In this section, we illustrate how to discover vulnerable code with the patterns we inferred. The codes in PHP 7.0.8 are used to search similar vulnerabilities, and some suspicious codes have been matched with the inferred pattern.
Listing 5 shows the instantiation of the first pattern. It describes the constraint to the memcpy. In this case, the first two sources reaching to memcpy should match the regular expression . * char\ * . * and . * const. * char\ * . * respectively, which indicates the type of two sources are char * and const\char * . This corresponds to the process of string. For the third source controlled by attackers, it should satisfy the constraint . * len. * ≥ . * len. * −\d, which describe the constraint to the length of string.
Applying the above pattern to the PHP, a snippet suspicious code have been matched. Listing 6 shows the problematic function virtual_file_ex in source file zend\zend_virtual_cwd.c. In this case, the attackercontrolled source path_length only checks for a value of zero and an oversize value, but never checks for a negative value. And then the taint source reaches to the memcpy. This missing check may lead to a crash when the value of path_length is a negative value. Similarly, the Listing 7 shows the vulnerable code discovered in source file ext\mcrypt\mcrypt.c, which is also matched with the first pattern. The code checks whether the encrypt data is a block cipher. But the value of the data_size, which is controlled by attacker, is not checked. If the data_size is assigned with 0xffffffff, the variable data_s, which pass to memcpy, is 0. When the variable data_len is used to copy data to data_s, the overflow is caused.
In contrast to the first pattern, the third pattern is focused on the checking of string length. In particular, the function simplestring_addn in source file ext\xmlrpc\libxmlrpc\simplestring.c as shown in Listing 8 causes an overflow when it checks the string length. Cases where the amount of data to be copied into a buffer are directly dependent on an attacker-controlled integer are common sources for buffer overflows, the out of bounds write on the heap can be caused by a malicious php script. 
E. DISCUSSION
The patterns inferred with our method demonstrates the merits of our method. Compared with Joern, our method can automatically extract the sinks in code base, where the sinks are given in Joern. Nevertheless, there exist certain imitations that we discuss in the following.
First, our method is tailored to taint-style vulnerability, and is just suitable for the vulnerabilities which sinks and sources are contained in the source-sink list. If the vulnerability is caused by the new sink, the performance of our method may be not good. Fortunately, some methods [38] have been proposed to infer the source and sink. We will apply our method to other vulnerability types, and improve our method to infer the sinks automatically.
Second, our method consider the changed condition statements as the sanitizations. In some cases, the sanitizations are presented as the using of API function. Hence, more detailed analysis for the sanitizations should be done in the future works.
Third, our method analyze the code statically, and don't consider the dynamic property. The dynamic analysis techniques run the program, and collect the runtime information to analyze the program behavior. Compared with static analysis, dynamic analysis techniques performance well in the detection of some vulnerabilities. Combining our method with dynamic analysis techniques may be help for the vulnerability detection.
V. RELATED WORK
Our work is mainly focused on inferring the vulnerability patterns from code changes between vulnerabilities and their patches, and discovering similar vulnerabilities. In this section, we review related work around taintstyle vulnerability detection, patterns inference and code changes.
A. DETECTING TAINT-STYLE VULNERABILITY
To maintain security of applications, some researchers study the securer protocol [4] , [5] for network data communication.
In contrast, other researchers study the security of source code, and many static [6] , [8] , [10] , [11] and dynamic [9] techniques have been proposed to detect vulnerabilities automatically. Gotovchits et al. [6] detect the vulnerability in binary-level. They develop a domain-specific language to express security properties and first use µflux technique to generate data dependence facts. Both of Livshits et al. [8] and Jovanovic et al. [10] concentrate on the taint-style vulnerabilities appear in the web applications. Reference [8] adopt a precise points-to analysis to statically analyzed code and complete the specification for vulnerability discovery. In contrast to [8] , in addition to points-to analysis, [10] also employ a precise alias analysis targeted at the unique reference semantics commonly found in scripting languages, and they discover hundreds of previously unknown vulnerabilities.
Arzt et al. [11] focus on the data leak problem in the smartphones, which need to solve with taint-analysis approaches. FLOWDROID, the tool they presented, can precisely model the Android's lifecycle. And the experiment results show that their method can find a very high fraction of data leaks while keeping the rate of false positives low. Different with [11] , Arroyo et al. [37] develop a user configurable taint checker for C programs.
Shastry et al. [9] propose a fuzz-based technique to detect the taint-style vulnerabilities. As the test coverage is the main drawback of fuzzing, they leverage the fuzzer to localize the fault and narrows the search space. With the localized faulty code, they automatically generate vulnerability templates.
Yamaguchi et al. [2] , [3] propose a method to automatically infer search patterns for taint-style vulnerabilities, which is the basis of our work. Their method automatically identifies corresponding source-sink systems and infer the most frequent patterns in these systems. Different with their method, our method infers the patterns from code changes between vulnerabilities and their patches, which is a supplement to their work.
B. INFERRING PATTERNS
Vulnerability detection always requires patterns or specifications to operate. Manually summarizing these patterns is a time-consuming task. A considerable approaches have been proposed to infer patterns automatically. Livshits et al. [12] employ the propagation graph to model the information flow paths and then automatically infer explicit information flow specifications. Some research infer specifications for taint-style vulnerability. Reference [14] infer library specifications for the client program, and [13] , [21] infer candidate specifications for missing program pieces. Bastani et al. [13] consider the inferring missing specifications problem as a context-free language reachability problem, and Clapp et al. [21] mine explicit information flow specifications from concrete executions. It is an effective technique to generate explicit information flow specifications for platform methods and outperforms manual flow annotations in practice.
Machine learning, and data mining are proved to be practical for inferring patterns [15] - [19] . These techniques make use of statistical methods accelerate the process of code analysis by extracting the most frequent patterns in the code repository. These methods also limited to missing rare patterns. Our method differs in that it applies code changes to infer the related patterns, which is a supplement to the above methods.
C. LEARNING FROM CODE CHANGES
Code changes has to been turned out practical for program analysis. Paletov et al. [22] and Nguyen et al. [24] use code change to recommend API. Code changes is also used in the software security research [25] , [28] - [31] . Khan and Ahsan [25] explore the advantage of fine-grained source code changes to predict bugs. Rather than use code changes in code analysis, Giger et al. [28] and Le and Pattison [29] study whether the code changes caused defects. Reference [28] develop a technique to analyze the influences of changes in source code and then induce the source code change patterns. Reference [29] propose a framework to determine whether a patch correctly fixes a bug with a novel program representation, namely multiversion interprocedural control flow graph. Cai and Jenkins [31] analyze the difference between the original and evolved app versions, and present a incremental taint analysis approach to narrows down the search space of taint checking. The technique largely reduced the cost of taint analysis and improves the overall efficiency of checking multiple versions of the app.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented an approach to automatically infer patterns with the security patches and apply these patterns to detect the vulnerabilities. The approach is based on the observation that the sanitizations are missed in the vulnerable and then added in the patched version of the program. The changes are captured and used to infer VOLUME 7, 2019 the vulnerability patterns. The experiments have shown that our method inferred 6 patterns successfully. Our method leveraged the security information extracted from the security patches to guide the vulnerabilities discovered, which has built the bridge from the patch understanding to the vulnerability discovery. Our method is tailored to taint-style vulnerabilities, in the future, we plan to extend our work to analyze other types of vulnerabilities and combine with the dynamic analyze, such as symbolic execution, to infer more precise patterns. 
